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ABSTRACT
In 2015, the needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees who arrived in Germany could only
be met by deploying all available civil protection units. This article presents procedures and
practices of state and non-state formal actors in the field of civil protection and related crisis
management structures implemented and established across the board in the municipalities, the
Federal Government and mass shelters, in particular in Bavaria. From a disaster research and
humanitarian studies perspective we use the concept of “patterns of interpretation” to analyse
the application of the “humanitarian emergency” and the “disaster situation” procedures to dis-
cuss whether the situation can really be categorized as “either-or” or whether the coexistence
of the two served a function in managing such a complex situation. Finally, we discuss some
developments that occurred after 2015/16 and consider the extent to which these developments
shift or expand the existing patterns of interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
On September 4th, 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the thousands of refugees
stranded in Budapest would not be rejected at the border, as Germany was faced with an “ex-
tremely acute humanitarian situation” (Br€ocker and Quadbeck, 2015, own translation). This politi-
cally highly controversial decision invoked a “humanitarian imperative” (Schmitz, 2015, own
translation). In the national political discourse and the discussion about the number of refugees
which had been increasing in previous months the situation had not been described as a “humani-
tarian emergency” before. At the same time, the needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees who
had already arrived in Germany could only be met by deploying all available civil protection units
(CPU) (German: Bev€olkerungsschutz)1 from domestic aid organizations like the German Red Cross
(GRC) or the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). However, politically responsible actors,
such as Mayors, District Administrators or State Ministers of the Interior, did not have recourse to
the corresponding legal and formal disaster declaration as codified in disaster (response) law. From
the perspective of the actors on the ground such as units operating emergency shelters, it was
incomprehensible, why such a well-functioning crisis management system, the activation of which
could have significantly simplified and improved the processing of the situation, was not used for-
mally.
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The article takes the competing patterns of interpretation of the “humanitarian emergency” and
the “disaster situation” as well as the resulting, at times contradictory, practices, structures and pro-
cedures of state and non-state formal actors2 in the field of civil protection and related crisis man-
agement structures as the starting point for the analysis and interpretation of how the 2015/16
refugee crisis in Germany was managed.
Both patterns of interpretation have revealed themselves to be contested and controversial. It has
often been unclear what is meant by the term “humanitarian emergency”, how it is distinguishable
from a “disaster situation” and whether it was appropriate to apply the terms to the situation in
Germany in 2015 (Pries, 2019).
The approach through the analysis of the patterns of interpretation and their associated prac-
tices makes it possible to not think of the events of 2015/16 solely in terms of state administra-
tive structures and inter-organizational cooperation, as the majority of the existing analyses so far
argue (Paterock, 2016; Radtke and Fleischer, 2019). It rather allows understanding them as
embedded in socially existing structures of meaning and interpretation, which in turn constitute
certain practices and procedures as socially meaningful. Patterns of interpretation as concepts of
the sociology of knowledge are “socially valid interpretations of the environment and the self,
connected with instructions for action. Patterns of interpretation structure collective everyday
action by providing models of (ideal) typical situations under which facts, events and experiences
are subsumed on the basis of certain characteristics” (H€offling et al., 2002). Patterns of interpreta-
tion are functional in relation to certain tests of action; they have normative power of interpreta-
tion and thus shape social realities by prescribing interpretations and patterns of action. Their
validity can vary between different groups, organisations or institutions. In addition, patterns of
interpretation are relatively stable and can also withstand inconsistencies to a limited extent
(Reichertz, 1986), but they are also always open to development and therefore also subject to
change. According to M€uller (2013), actors, especially in crises, are forced to change existing
patterns of interpretation or, if necessary, to strive for new patterns of interpretation. Thus, pat-
terns of interpretation only persist until they are called into question again by new crises them-
selves.
In addition to a detailed literature study, this paper is based on 32 semi-structured explorative
interviews with experts from CPUs involved in refugee aid (GRC, THW, Workers’ Samaritan Fed-
eration (Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB)), Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief
(BBK), fire brigades, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), social
and welfare organizations (Berliner Stadtmission, Arbeiterwohlfahrt), humanitarian actors (Interna-
tional Rescue Committee (IRC), Red Cross Emergency Response Units (ERU)), independent inter-
national humanitarian experts as well as the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).
The aim of the explorative expert interviews was to get an understanding how the situation 2015/
16 was framed and dealt with and what lessons learned were identified by different actors involved
in formal and informal crisis management.3 The experts were selected using snowball sampling and
the interviews were analysed by content analysis. Additionally, results from expert workshops and
participatory observations in emergency shelters, mass shelters (so-called “waiting rooms”) as well
as within organizations were included. These data were collected both during the high period of
refugee arrivals in 2015/16, and as part of a research project4 in 2019 which looks from a scientific
as well as from a practitioner’s point of view into learning processes after the refugee crisis. The
analysis is embedded in a more comprehensive study of the European dimension of the refugee cri-
sis.
In the first section, we outline the concrete procedures and practices as they were implemented
and established across the board in the municipalities, the Federal Government and in mass shel-
ters in Bavaria, the so-called “waiting rooms” in 2015/16, after a brief introduction to the com-
plexity of German asylum law. We then analyse from the perspective of disaster research and
humanitarian studies the underlying patterns of interpretation of the “humanitarian emergency”
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and the “disaster situation” in order to finally initiate considerations in the discussion section as
to whether the situation can be categorized under either one of the interpretation patterns or
somewhere in between. Finally, we briefly list some developments that occurred after 2015/16
and consider the extent to which these developments shift or expand the existing patterns of
interpretation.
With this approach and focus the paper goes beyond current debates about international refugee
protection in forced migration and refugee studies that mostly address the issue from legal, gover-
nance, regime or economic perspectives (Betts and Loescher, 2014; Hinger et al., 2016; Kleist,
2017; Betts and Collier, 2018), but do not take into account the specific practices, procedures as
well as respective actors such as CPUs on the ground in (Central) Europe during the refugee crisis
2015/16.
MANAGING THE REFUGEE CRISIS 2015/16
Deployments in refugee aid are nothing fundamentally new for CPUs in Germany: For example,
there were aid missions during the period of flight from the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
in the years 1949–1955 after the foundation of the two German states, especially in Berlin (Blos,
1979; Riesenberger, 2002). In the years 1949 to 1955, almost 900,000 refugees reached Berlin cre-
ating major challenges for the Berlin GRC to shelter and assist all refugees.5 Due to these special
challenges, the GRC received support from delegates the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) from abroad (Blos, 1979).
Later, resettlers from Eastern Europe in the 1960–1980s or GDR refugees in 1989 led to the
deployment of aid organisations (Pr€asidium des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes, 1989). For instance,
in 1989, the GRC, the Hungarian Red Cross and others managed refugee camps in Csilleberc
and Zanka in Hungary and the GRC assisted refugees in a camp that was set within the German
Embassy in Prague. In September 1989, the GRC headquarters was tasked to build camps for
GDR refugees at the German-Austrian border while more or less all German aid organizations
provided assistance to refugees all over Germany. Until 2007, the GRC also had a specific unit,
the relief unit (German: DRK Hilfszug), which was used both in international humanitarian aid
and in national civil protection (e.g., in Hungary, during the Yugoslav Wars, and in 1989 in
Warsaw, Prague and Bavaria) and explicitly served to “feed, shelter, register and to provide
assistance to refugees” (Peter, 2001, 32, own translation). For a long time, refugee movements
were an important aspect of civil protection planning in times of imminent nuclear war (Diebel,
2017). After the turn of the millennium, refugee movements more and more disappeared in offi-
cial documents of disaster and crisis management (Schutzkommission beim Bundesminister des
Innern, 2006; Schutzkommission beim Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011). Only with the
guideline “Conception of Civil Defence” of 2016 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2016) does the
“management of refugee flows and population movements” reappear under point “Dealing with
Hybrid Threats”.
However, the previous aid missions to assist refugees before 2015/16 were exclusively emer-
gency aid missions for the CPUs, in which questions of asylum law did not play a major role. In
2015/16, the asylum process, especially in the “waiting rooms”, but also beyond, became the linch-
pin of the work of the aid organizations, without their prior preparation and without equivalent cri-
sis management structures in the corresponding asylum structures.
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the interpretations and practices, the following
sub-section briefly introduces the complexity of the German asylum system. In the following sub-
sections, the crisis management measures established in 2015/16 for the care of refugees at differ-
ent levels and in different contexts are presented.
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The asylum system in Germany
The asylum system in Germany is extraordinarily complex and subject to continuous change due to
the specific responsibilities of the federal, state and local governments and on account of stark dif-
ferences in systems for initial reception facilities (Radtke and Fleischer, 2019).
During the first six months, refugees are accommodated in state facilities, which also include
emergency shelters that are mostly run by the municipalities in administrative assistance but are
financed by the state (Bogumil et al., 2016). In addition to registering asylum seekers, the reception
facilities managed by the states are tasked with carrying out medical examinations, providing
accommodation and ensuring that asylum seekers are presented to the responsible asylum process-
ing office. All asylum applications are processed by the BAMF, an authority within the jurisdiction
of the BMI.
The BAMF represents the central axis of the asylum process, but in 2015/16 underwent a diffi-
cult internal crisis and restructuring of its own. In 2014, the BAMF registered an increased number
of asylum applications (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014), which the existing personnel resources were
unable to manage. Corresponding warnings and requests for staff increases by then BAMF Presi-
dent Schmidt to politicians went unheard (Dummer et al., 2016). The huge increase in asylum seek-
ers in 2015 thus encountered an administration that was in a state of crisis already, without any
crisis management mechanisms at its disposal.
Challenges of refugee assistance in 2015/16
From July 2015, in view of the high numbers of refugees throughout Germany, emergency shelters
were built on behalf of the federal states and municipalities – often with the support of CPUs
(Grote, 2018). For the GRC this was the largest mission since the end of German reunification
(Deutsches Rotes Kreuz e.V., 2015), for THW it was the longest lasting mission and that with the
largest geographical distribution (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, 2018). In many cases, the
supply was additionally provided by civil society organisations and individual volunteers who
spontaneously volunteered by donating goods or otherwise becoming involved (Feischmidt et al.,
2019). The CPUs, which were only in exceptional cases requested by the federal states through dis-
aster alarms, but rather through other, often less formal mechanisms, had to contend with several
major challenges. With the exception of the state of defence, federal intervention in the affairs of
the states—which include the aid and assistance of refugees—is constitutionally only possible if
several states are affected by a natural hazard or a large-scale accident, or if there is a suitable
appeal from the states that they have insufficient capacities to cope with the situation (Leupold,
2012). Thus, as long as this is not the case, the aid organizations that, like the GRC, orient them-
selves towards federalism and the territorial principle, were dependent on the subsidiary resources
available in the state, district and local associations.
Some municipalities had already experienced an increase in refugees since 2014 and had reached
their capacity limits faster than others in 2015, especially in the states close to the border such as
Bavaria (Grote, 2018). There were considerable bottlenecks in the initial supply of food and non-
food items, as early as mid-2015, the GRC had to fall back on the federal disaster emergency
stockpile (Sieland, 2016). Later additional items had to be flown in from GRC sister organisations
(Canada and USA) abroad. In the summer of 2015, CPUs were still somewhat able to cover their
operations through their own formal voluntary structures, but these themselves reached their limits
with the renewed increase in refugee arrivals in the autumn of 2015 (Grote, 2018). Many of the
smaller state, district and/or local associations of aid organizations in particular had already
deployed all the units actually available for disaster management, which meant that in the event of
a disaster, there would be no more capacity for further operations (own interviews).
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The emergency shelters, which were built in large numbers and often under extremely difficult
conditions, were hardly built according to minimum standards, as these did not exist in Germany
until then (Cremer, 2014). They were mostly well below the internationally recognized SPHERE
minimum standards that “at the onset of a crisis help to identify immediate needs and prioritise
activities that will address these needs” (Sphere Association, 2018, p. 9), which originally were
developed for non-European contexts and had not yet been adapted to European contexts
(Deutsches Rotes Kreuz and IFRC Shelter Research Unit, 2016). European “minimum standards
for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons” never played a
role in Germany either, since the respective EU directive (European Council, 2001) was not acti-
vated in 2015 (Gluns and Wessels, 2017).
For many volunteers in the field of CPUs, it was unclear on which legal basis they were
deployed, as well as why, despite the poor supply situation, situations were so seldom declared as
disaster situations—yet the corresponding procedures, structures and material were used nonethe-
less, which resulted in legal grey areas (own interviews).
A further challenge for the various civil protection actors was that there was hardly any knowl-
edge about the asylum system, but the entire planning and coordination of the aid and assistance of
refugees was largely determined by the asylum process. Because the processing of asylum applica-
tions took longer than legally required the refugees had to stay in emergency shelters and initial
reception facilities longer than expected (Sieland, 2017). The “fluid nature of the migrant and refu-
gee populations” (Borton et al., 2015, p. 15) and their agency presented a further challenge, such
as when large numbers of arrivals withdrew themselves from the (mass) shelters, which led to some
absurd management attempts (own interviews), when, for instance, transportation capacities were
organized with great efforts only to realize that refugees had already found other means of trans-
portation themselves.
Federal crisis management
As the number of unregistered entries at the German-Austrian border increased, especially in
August/September 2015, border control authorities were heavily burdened and there were clear
warnings from the security authorities on rising security risks (Lohse, 2015). Therefore, border con-
trols were introduced in Germany on September 13th (Grote, 2018).
The establishment of a coordinated “crisis” management system at the federal level began at the
end of August 2015 (see Table 1), although the terms “crisis” and “disaster” were largely avoided
for political reasons (Sieland, 2016) and there were deviations from pre-planned crisis management
procedures and corresponding legal ambiguities (own interviews). Those units with recourse to civil
protection resources were:
(1) the Staff Coordination of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Admission, which was part of the
BMI and served as support for the Steering Committee Coping with the Refugee Situation
and the Federation-States Coordination Taskforce for Asylum, subsequently resorted to CPU
personnel resources (Radtke and Fleischer, 2019).6
(2) Federal Government Coordination Office for the Distribution of Refugees that was estab-
lished at the Minister-President Conference of the States to take over the distribution of refu-
gees who were arriving predominantly in Bavaria. The responsibility initially lay in the
hands of a staff of approx. 30 experts. Some of them were withdrawn from the BBK and
who brought with them corresponding logistical and organizational knowledge of civil pro-
tection, as well as the German armed forces, the German railway company, bus companies,
federal police, state police, aid organizations, THW, fire departments and representatives of
the states.
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(3) mass shelters (“waiting rooms”) that were opened in Bavaria, initiated by the Federal
Government, built up by CPUs and operationally managed by the BAMF. In the “waiting
rooms” all arriving refugees were to be registered and assisted according to humanitarian aid
frameworks. These were set up as a buffer until procedures for “orderly” onward transport
were put in place (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017).
Simultaneously the BAMF began with the largest restructuring and personnel development pro-
cess in its history. Internal processes and decision-making procedures were optimized, new digi-
tized procedures introduced, thousands of new employees hired in the shortest possible time or
borrowed from other authorities (Grote, 2018).
Installation of waiting rooms
Many of the civil protection organizations also had extensive knowledge of international humanitar-
ian aid in their international units, especially in refugee aid and camp construction, such as THW
with numerous deployments, e.g., its involvement in Iraq, Bangladesh, etc. This knowledge was
transferred very effectively from the international to the national sphere: the establishment of “wait-
ing rooms” in Bavaria is of particular interest in this context. At the end of August 2015, it became
apparent that the Bavarian actors could no longer handle the high number of refugees at the Ger-
man-Austrian border. The Federal Government decreed that in Bavaria mass shelters, “waiting
rooms” in support of the Bavarian State, should be set up as federal facilities that meet interna-
tional humanitarian standards (Sieland, 2017). The federal government commissioned the GRC
headquarters to create and operate reception facilities for up to 20,000 persons for a period of two
months.
The GRC headquarters activated its Command and Control Centre, which is normally used for
major international aid missions or major disaster situations involving more than one state
TABLE 1
ACTIONS FEDERAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Date Action
26th August 2015 Setting up Federation-L€ander Coordination Taskforce for Asylum (German:
Bund-L€ander-Koordinierungsstab Asyl (BLKA))
26th August 2015 Steering Committee Coping with the Refugee Situation (German:
Lenkungsausschuss „Bew€altigung der Fl€uchtlingslage) and Staff Coordina-
tion of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Admission (German: Stab Koor-
dinierung der Fl€uchtlings- und Asylbewerberaufnahme (KFA)) established in
BMI
11th September 2015 Federal Government commissioned the GRC headquarters to create and
operate waiting rooms for up to 20,000 persons
13th September 2015 Reintroduction of border controls
21th September 2015 Federal Government Coordination Office for the Distribution of Refugees (Ger-
man: Koordinierungsstelle Fl€uchtlingsverteilung Bund (KoSt-FV Bund)) under
area of responsibility of BMI established
21th September 2015 Opening of waiting room Feldkirchen
7th October 2015 Adoption of a “Concept to Coordinate the Refugee Situation” and staff unit
“Refugees” in BKAmt
19th October 2015 Opening of waiting room Erding
20th October 2015 Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act
30th October 2015 German-Austrian Agreement
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association in Germany and is set up in the same way as a coordination staff for disaster manage-
ment (Sieland, 2017). The mandate for the “waiting rooms” also included first aid, transport, pre-
registration and distribution of refugees to the federal states (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017). The
BMI guaranteed the impartiality and neutrality of the GRC in order to ensure the humanitarian mis-
sion of the GRC (Sieland, 2017). This was also reflected in the construction of the “waiting
rooms”, in which sovereign areas led by the BAMF (registration by the BAMF with administrative
support of the armed forces) and humanitarian protection and registration areas led by the GRC
were spatially separated. In addition, the THW and the armed forces were commissioned to set up
the camp and the BAMF to manage it, and GRC liaison officers were sent to the Command and
Control Centre of the Austrian Red Cross to ensure the necessary flow of information (Sieland,
2017). The BAMF had not become operational in managing such camps since its foundation, so
that new structures and responsibilities also had to be established at the command level. In addition
to massive problems with the construction of the facilities and a lack of acceptance within local
politics, appropriate knowledge had to be used for the construction and operation of shelters of this
size (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017). This was covered by the deployment of experts from THW and
GRC with experience in international aid missions and, in the context of the ERU7s, by 84 interna-
tional delegates from ten GRC sister organizations who had experience in setting up and running a
refugee camp in international humanitarian aid contexts (Sieland, 2017). As a result of the integra-
tion of these international experiences, for instance, separate and specially secured areas for women
travelling alone were set up (Sieland, 2016, 2017). As is customary in international humanitarian
aid missions, ad-hoc training in the principles of the Red Cross movement for personnel outside
the organization was quickly conducted on site (Sieland, 2017).
At the same time, the management of a refugee camp with the support of international personnel
led to new challenges: the basic requirements were English language skills, which were not avail-
able to all national helpers or local political actors and thus made communication more difficult.
ERU delegates experienced in humanitarian aid were initially sceptical about the close cooperation
with the uniformed armed forces, as they were not used to it and as this cooperation is sometimes
viewed sceptically within international humanitarian aid (Barnett, 2013). It also has often been
unclear how the command and communication structures between the international delegates and
the armed forces were regulated (Sieland, 2017). The SPHERE standards, which also have to be
considered by the International Red Cross Movement, were undercut many times over, e.g., in the
sanitary facilities (Sieland, 2017).
FRAMING THE REFUGEE SITUATION AS “DISASTER SITUATION” AND
“HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY”
Operationally, the refugee situation in 2015/16 was dealt with civil protection procedures and struc-
tures as well as international humanitarian aid. Accordingly, the situation was framed by the
respective actors using the respective interpretations of “disaster situation” and “humanitarian emer-
gency”. In the following section, we analyse the two patterns of interpretation, their applicability to
the 2015/16 situation, but also the resulting limitations and inconsistencies.
2015/16 as a “disaster situation”
Disasters in Germany are not defined de jure by specific scenarios, but by the extraordinary endan-
germent of objects of protection, the need for additional resources and the cooperation of various
authorities and organizations under the leadership of a disaster management authority (Leupold,
2012). The sixteen German states are legally responsible for disaster management. In principle, due
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to the federal system, the Federal Government may only in exceptional cases, danger or damage
situations—e.g., when several states are collectively affected by a disaster, terrorist attacks and the
failure of critical infrastructures, pandemics or CBRN hazards or only with the consent of the states
—intervene in the states’ areas of responsibility and provide administrative assistance—the excep-
tion being in the case of defence (Voßschmidt, 2016). If the capacities available to a state are not
sufficient in the event of a disaster, the state can request forces and resources from other adminis-
trations, but also from the federal police, the armed forces and the THW as so-called administrative
assistance (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2015). The consequences of declaring the disaster are
far-reaching: they include modifications in the organization of the authorities, obligations to bear
costs at the declaring level, the repeal of certain laws and regulations intended for everyday use,
the ability to obtain necessary resources quickly, up to the option to obligate citizens to help, or
the restriction of citizens’ fundamental rights.
As a significant number of interviewees, especially those working on the ground, stated, the dis-
aster declaration would have made it possible to activate these existing crisis mechanisms and to
deal with the challenges in structured and planned way. In some very rare cases individual counties
or cities attempted to make use of a disaster declaration as, for instance, in October 2015, the
Main-Taunus district declared a disaster situation for the first time since 1945. The reason was the
announcement by the state that the district had to create accommodation for 1,000 refugees as
quickly as possible (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015). At the end of August 2015, it was also
discussed in Berlin whether the disaster situation should be declared in order to defuse the dramatic
supply and accommodation situation (Keilani, 2015). In other places, such as Munich, specific pro-
cedures and practices of disaster response law were applied (M€uller-Tischer, 2015).
Despite these exceptional cases as we have shown above the CPUs acted practically as if they
were in a declared disaster situation: The situation could only be managed through the massive
(and perhaps even the largest ever in Germany) deployment of resources, processes and persons
who had been reserved or trained for civil protection. This is true for initial reception facilities, reg-
istration processes, assistance, sheltering of refugees in federal disaster management facilities and
the management of the KoSt-FV. With the establishment of the waiting rooms on behalf of the
Federal Government, the Federation itself—at least from the perspective of GRC’s CPU units—
acted as though in “disaster mode” by taking federal measures on the territory of a federal state for
the first time since the Federal Republic was founded (Sieland, 2017): This legally implies that the
state’s own resources were insufficient and that assistance from the Federal Government was
requested by the state. For the CPUs, the refugee situation was practically framed as a disaster situ-
ation because for them a disaster is defined by their capabilities, i.e. that the pattern of interpreta-
tion of the situation is applied in situations in which the specific problem-solving capabilities of the
disaster management organizations are required and applied (Dombrowsky, 1996).
The question why there was no formal statewide disaster declaration is complex and difficult to
answer: The “disaster situation” interpretation pattern is currently used in praxis in such a way that
the concept of disaster refers to natural hazards or technical hazards with great damage potential.
On its own, a large number of people in need of aid is not necessarily sufficient to classify an
event as a disaster situation. Furthermore, according to Dombrowsky (1983), a disaster declaration
must always be put into effect by the population and the actors involved in order to be recognized
and accepted as such. A disaster declaration therefore is not only a formal act, but rather a highly
conflictive and powerful act of rendering social reality that has to be negotiated between all related
social actors (Rubenstein, 2015).
In the case of 2015/16, it was primarily not enacted out of political reasons according to CPUs
(Sieland, 2016). The increasing right-wing populist and extremist currents were not to be exacer-
bated by an association of refugees with a “disaster”. Nor was it intended to admit publicly and
internationally that the situation was too severe to handle and that the motivation of the civil soci-
ety actors and independent volunteers was feared to be weakening (own interviews). Furthermore,
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in practical terms, the declaration of a disaster would also have been accompanied by more exten-
sive financial obligations for the states involved, at a time when they were hoping for more support
from the Federal Government.
2015/16 as a “humanitarian emergency”
The nature of the humanitarian emergency is much more difficult to determine than the disaster sit-
uation. There are no clear definitions of what constitutes “humanitarian” (Calhoun, 2008) or how
humanitarian aid or emergencies vary from other types of extreme events (Rieff, 2002; Barnett,
2013). Since humanitarian scenarios may look very different and “humanitarian aid is delivered by
an increasingly varied array of old and new organisations” (Hilhorst and Pereboom, 2017, p. 99)
ideal-type representations of humanitarian aid hardly represent the variety of humanitarianism.
Broadly speaking, in “classical humanitarianism” the humanitarian core principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence are seen as normative guidelines governing the way
humanitarian aid acts whereas in times of “crisis as the new normality” (Hilhorst, 2018, p. 5) “re-
silience humanitarianism” is more focused on building resilient communities.
Actors in Germany often referred to the value structures of the “classical humanitarianism” and,
in some cases, explicitly to a “humanitarian emergency”, in response to which humanitarian action
should be taken. In doing so, they endeavoured to interpret the pattern, or at least referred to it
politically and strategically, in order to legitimize their concrete practices and the application of
structures and rules from other contexts. The humanitarian argument used by Angela Merkel in
autumn 2015 to justify her actions was also taken up by other actors: Peter Altmaier, head of the
Federal Office of the Chancellery (BKAmt) and refugee coordinator of the Federal Government in
autumn 2015, shortly afterwards described the management of the refugee crisis in Bavaria as a
“humanitarian calling card“ for Germany, which had gained worldwide recognition (Altmaier,
2015, own translation). Aydan €Ozoguz, German Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees and Inte-
gration stated in an interview in 2017 that “our main concern was to prevent a humanitarian emer-
gency” (€Ozoguz, 2017, p. 6). CPUs also resorted to this pattern of interpretation: employees of the
GRC justified their involvement in refugee assistance and corresponding emergency aid operations
with their role as humanitarian auxiliary of the Federal Government (Richert, 2018): “We are the
Red Cross, there is a humanitarian problem, we have to take action” (own interviews, own transla-
tion). Under the keyword “humanitarian aid”, the Berlin Fire Department provided refugee assis-
tance (Plock and Sirtl 2016; Berliner Feuerwehr, 2015) and the THW provided a humanitarian
basic supply for the refugees (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, 2016). Volunteer organizations
also interpreted their commitment as “humanitarian first response” (Moabit hilft e.V., 2019) to com-
pensate for the dramatic deterioration in the supply situation for refugees, especially in front of Ber-
lin´s Regional Agency for Health and Social Affairs (Eddy and Johannsen, 2015; Bock, 2018).
This kind of volunteering has been labelled as “citizen humanitarianism” (Borton and Collinson,
2017, p. 21) later.
There are approaches that argue in a similarly constitutive way as for the disaster case, when it
is said that wherever humanitarian actors are deployed or humanitarian principles are applied as in
the case of the GRC and ERUs or the waiting rooms in Bavaria, there is also a humanitarian emer-
gency (Bragg, 2015). The situation in Germany also shows some analogies to humanitarian emer-
gencies in the international humanitarian system: the beneficiaries were refugees, who are now also
the central recipients of international humanitarian aid. The waiting rooms were also an attempt to
create a system in accordance with the requirements of international humanitarian aid.
At the same time, however, the formal international humanitarian system faced great difficulties
in applying the corresponding pattern of interpretation and positioning itself vis-a-vis the situation
and developments in Europe due to its ideologically and historically shaped orientation towards
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low-income and fragile states—and the identity of humanitarian aid to bring aid from countries of
the Global North to the Global South (cf. Bragg, 2015): “Established humanitarian actors found it
difficult to respond [. . .] in a context that was so ‘close to home’” (Borton and Collinson, 2017:
27). The widespread expectation that the EU (and its member states), as the largest common eco-
nomic area in terms of GDP, would be able to handle the situation—relatively small in comparison
with other emergencies—with its “own” capacities stood in the way of the pattern of interpretation
(Borton, 2016; DeLargy, 2016; Philipps, 2019). Accordingly, apart from individual contexts in Ger-
many, on the Balkan route (Latifi, 2017) and in Greece (Dittmer and Lorenz, 2018), there was no
broad formation of donors, appeals and humanitarian (I)NGOs to be expected in the context of the
interpretation pattern. The situation in Central Europe therefore hardly aligned with what the estab-
lished formal humanitarian actors define as a humanitarian emergency and what causes the corre-
sponding options and need for action (own interviews).
RESPONDING IN-BETWEEN: THE COEXISTENCE OF THE “DISASTER
SITUATION” AND THE “HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY”
The above analysis shows that the situation in Germany in 2015/16 is by no means simple to deter-
mine in terms of one of the existing patterns of interpretation alone. Instead, a complex, fragmented
structure of heterogeneous patterns of interpretation and practices can be observed across all actors,
sometimes even within one and the same person, which also caused coordination and communica-
tion problems, but at the same time enabled the situation to be handled creatively.
Although the pattern of interpretation of disaster situations and the legal definition of disasters
“fit” the fact that in some places the existing structures have been overtaxed, so that assistance
from other levels and actors became necessary, other components of the pattern of interpretation,
such as the historically developed application of disaster response (law) in Germany, as well as the
negative connotation of the term and political considerations regarding right-wing currents in Ger-
many, made it more difficult.
The sudden singular natural or technical trigger associated with the pattern of interpretation of
the disaster situation—as problematic as this may be in the view of enlightened perspective—that
causes physical destruction can hardly be discerned in 2015/16—at least in Europe—since “only” a
large number of people were affected. Besides, it took place in a field with primary responsibility
that traditionally has nothing to do with civil protection, such as the asylum system or social wel-
fare work.
The pattern of interpretation of the humanitarian emergency, on the other hand, seems to be
much more open to slow-onset events with a multitude of complex causes and complex emergen-
cies as it was the case in 2015/16. In contrast to the disaster situation, this pattern of interpretation
focuses less on the causes than on the plight of a large number of people. Nevertheless, there are
also reasons here why the application of this pattern of interpretation appears problematic for the
given case: even the pattern of interpretation of a humanitarian emergency established in the
humanitarian system, which legitimizes the intervention of humanitarian actors, seems to be diffi-
cult to apply due to the comparatively small number of people in need compared to other humani-
tarian crises and, above all, the state structures within Germany.
The preceding analyses have shown that the 2015/16 crisis was accordingly fragmented and han-
dled with different interpretations, instruments and resources. The resulting in-between situation
therefore appears to include different patterns of interpretation and their associated practices, with
the result that different instruments were used which seemed primarily to manage and distribute the
number of arriving refugees. The question of the implementation and enforcement of the registra-
tion of refugees—from asylum law, security relevant aspects as well as the overall coordination
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with regard to coherent federal policies—determined decisively the actions of the political actors.
The focus of the operational level was more on humanitarian aspects such as humane accommoda-
tion and aid.
This coexistence may be interpreted as a failure of a uniform strategy, during the situation as
well as in retrospect, but it can also be seen as a necessary step towards a solution to the particular
humanitarian and asylum challenges, possibly even security challenges. Wolbers et al. (2018)
observe that in highly complex crisis situations, the pursuit of coherence and clarity, which is
regarded as an essential factor for successful crisis management often fails or can only be achieved
with great efforts. From this, they conclude that discontinuity and ambiguity are rather the norm
and thus constitutive for coping with unclear, undefined situations. “In ambiguous situations the
consequence of having different actors engaged in coordination processes is that a multiplicity of
interpretations then arises. As possible interpretations multiply, a flux emerges, in which temporary
issue-specific coalitions form around different interpretations of the situation” (Wolbers et al., 2018,
1525, emphasis in original). Thus, the recourse to the pattern of interpretation of the humanitarian
emergency offered CPUs as well as political and civil society actors a pattern of interpretation in
many cases due to the lack of other categories considered legitimate and politically justifiable in
this case, in order to legitimize their interventions and actions—including the broad and compre-
hensive use of CUPs—in refugee aid. Furthermore, given the political situation in Germany it was
an incentive for the central political actors to recourse on different, to some extent alternative pat-
terns of interpretation. Thus, it became a strategic resource to utilize different patterns of interpreta-
tion and being able to apply distinct approaches that otherwise would not have been available
simultaneously.
For the operational actors on the ground, the ill-defined situation without a clearly defined legal
framework such as the disaster declaration resulted in a whole series of practical problems (own
interviews). For instance, without the indication of a disaster situation, SPHERE minimum stan-
dards appeared not to be relevant with the result that in many places no standards at all were avail-
able. Properties for housing refugees could not be seizured but had to be agreed on by various
political levels—with the result that precious time was lost and not the best-suited properties were
selected. Procurements (field beds, etc.) had to be purchased with lengthy public tenders. In some
place like Berlin, field beds from disaster stockpiles were set up in shelters but had to be removed
later because they only met the standards for disaster situations, but not for non-disaster accommo-
dation (own interviews). These operational obstacles often had direct impact on the provisions for
the refugees as lengthy procedures wasted resources. Additionally, for the refugees, the role of the
CPUs remained indefinite and it was not clear whether the sheltering and assistance were part of
the asylum procedure or impartial humanitarian aid (own interviews).
Thus, from an operational point of view, the question arises for the actors involved in 2015/16 in
the German context as to whether new patterns of interpretation and legal instruments are needed
for future situations of a similar kind, which are located between humanitarian emergency and dis-
aster situation. In view of humanitarian emergencies, according to the actors’ proposals (own inter-
views), the Federal Government should be able to invoke and coordinate this instrument, and it
should be able to draw on the resources and exceptions of the disaster, such as administrative and
financial exceptions, while avoiding the negative associations of the notion of disaster.
CONCLUSION
With the final closure of the border between Greece and (at that time) Macedonia and the conclu-
sion of the EU-Turkey Agreement, the situation in Germany eased from March 2016 onwards and
humanitarian needs shifted to Greece (Dittmer and Lorenz, 2018). With this shift, the need to
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establish a coherent explanatory pattern of interpretation also diminished. The extent to which the
patterns of interpretation considered have been lastingly changed by developments in Germany in
2015/16 or whether they remained the same after a phase of irritation is difficult to determine
today, without new comparable situations and a widespread political tendency to frame the events
as nonrecurring. However, various changes can be discerned, which at least point to minor changes
or expansions in the patterns of interpretation. Many of the actors involved at very different levels
have drawn lessons learned.
The German and European asylum systems have been extended to include components that could
in the future make it possible to deal more effectively with crises. At the European level, the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office (2018) published the “EASO Guidance on Contingency Planning in
the Context of Reception”, which is intended to serve as a guideline for the preparation of national
contingency plans. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) with its related reception,
accommodation and asylum procedures showed its limitations and the need to be reformed funda-
mentally (Beirens, 2018). Based on the experiences of 2015/16, the BAMF developed a so-called
ramp-up concept which makes it possible to achieve rapid staff growth in times of crisis (Grote,
2018).
With regard to the interpretation pattern of the disaster, it can be seen that the experiences of the
refugee situation and especially the “waiting rooms” as scenarios to be assumed in principle are
also taken into account in the context of the implementation of the civil defence concept. The
development of mass shelters for 5,000 people according to SPHERE minimum standards as well
as Shelter Guidelines of the IFRC is being aimed at analogously to the “waiting rooms” (Kr€uger,
2018).
In turn, the pattern of interpretation of the humanitarian emergency seems to have been supple-
mented by application contexts in the Global North. Given “’atypical’ crises that are causing mass
displacement”, some like Philipps (2019: 7) ask on behalf of IRC, “why should it not be legitimate
for the substantial technical expertise and resources of the international humanitarian system to
mobilize in response within the USA [or Europe, CD & DFL]” as the spatial boundaries of human-
itarian action seem to blur. In cooperation with the IFRC Shelter Research Unit, the GRC devel-
oped a guideline for the accommodation of refugees (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz and IFRC Shelter
Research Unit, 2016), which explicitly refers to humanitarian minimum standards such as SPHERE
and, for the first time, transfers them to colder climate regions.
The extent to which these small shifts in the patterns of interpretation—of which others could
certainly be mentioned—are suitable for better interpreting complex situations in the future and for
dealing with the challenges associated with these situations can hardly be estimated today and
seems highly contingent in view of the question of how unique the 2015/16 situation was.
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NOTES
1. The term “civil protection” (German: Bev€olkerungsschutz) includes both disaster management and the pro-
tection of the populace in civil defense in Germany.
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2. As the ‘humanitarian’ response of civil society and volunteers has been analyzed by others (e.g., Borton
and Collinson, 2017; Feischmidt et al., 2019; Pries, 2019) we focus on formal actors, organisations and
institutions.
3. For privacy and data protection reasons, a differentiated presentation and citation of the individual inter-
views will be omitted and subsumed under ‘own interviews’. Due to the very limited number of people
who worked in the contexts described, details of interviewees, such as job titles, would always include per-
sonally identifiable information.
4. Research project “Migration-Related Knowledge Management for Civil Protection of the Future” (WAKE),
sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, grant ID: 13N14748.
5. Like in 2015/16 it was discussed whether declaring the situation a disaster would enable scarce resource
and disaster management procedures. Due to possible psychological effects for the economy, the proposal
was rejected (Riesenberger, 2002).
6. The Staff Coordination of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Admission was first led by the Commander-in-
Chief of the Public Order Support Forces of the federal states in the BMI (German: Inspekteur der Bere-
itschaftspolizeien der L€ander). This is a central position in the Federal crisis management in disaster situa-
tions and accidents in case that they endanger the territory of more than one state. Later the Deputy Head
of the BBK at that time led the staff unit. Both did not carry out this task in their primary responsibilities
as Commander-in-Chief or Deputy Head. However, both had profound knowledge about federal crisis man-
agement in disaster situations.
7. ERUs are modular operational units of the national Red Cross societies and since 1996 have been “part of
the global IFRC Disaster Response system and therefore used in large emergency response operations, when
global assistance is needed and the Federation’s delegation(s) and the affected National Society cannot
respond alone“ (IFRC, 2019).
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